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In late 2004, at a town hall with Soldiers deployed to Southwest Asia, then-Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld responded to Soldiers’ questions about the availability of vehicle armor by saying that they had to go to war with the Army they had, not the one they wanted. The backlash from Soldiers, Congress and the American public was intense—they 
questioned the Army’s commitment to readiness and its budget priorities. As a result, the Army 
changed priorities and increased its investment in force protection by supplying critical combat 
equipment, including flame-resistant uniforms, to Soldiers deploying overseas to combat zones.
Fast forward to 2017, and the 39th chief of staff of the Army (CSA), Gen. Mark A. Milley, has 
made readiness the Army’s top priority. How does this affect the business of acquisition? How do 
Army acquisition leaders meet the CSA’s intent? Achieving readiness will require a hard look at 
acquisition timelines and methods. Simply put, it takes a changing mindset that prioritizes readi-
ness in acquisition decisions. As of 2017, for example, the stockpile inventory of flame-resistant 
combat uniforms satisfies the demand for deploying Soldiers but is insufficient to support a 
surge deployment of Soldiers for a large-scale conflict, were one to arise in the Middle East, Asia 
or Europe.
 
Army acquisition leaders need to fight through the Army’s bureaucracy, including its risk-averse 
and change-resistant culture, to meet the CSA’s intent. Having an adequate stockpile of flame-
resistant combat uniforms to support deploying Soldiers for a major regional conflict directly 
supports the CSA’s goal of improved readiness and is just one area that requires innovative acqui-
sition approaches.
What if multiple brigades of deploying Soldiers suddenly 
needed combat uniforms? Meeting challenges such as this 
one, strategically and creatively, before a conflict arises is 
the true test of readiness for Army acquisition.
by Dr. Robert F. Mortlock, Col., USA (Ret.)
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The traditional approach is to develop evolutionary acquisition 
strategies based on incremental development—that is, deliver 
a limited capability to the warfighter early on, then the full 
required capability later. In the case of a flame-resistant combat 
uniform shortage, this approach is not applicable because the 
procurement, production, storage and fielding of flame-resistant 
uniforms for a large-scale deployment on the order of tens of 
brigade combat teams (BCTs) is not a development program.
Alternative acquisition approaches can leverage lessons learned 
to solve the shortfall by applying existing processes in innovative 
ways. To ensure readiness with sufficient quantities of flame-
resistant combat uniforms for deploying Soldiers, it is essential 
that the Army make a long-term commitment by maintain-
ing a production capability and capacity that can meet surge 
requirements.
Fortunately for the Army, the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) cur-
rently provides all deploying Soldiers with the necessary combat 
uniforms and equipment to operate successfully on the battle-
field. However, the RFI program is funded from the overseas 
contingency operations (OCO) account, whose annual budget 
is based on the predicted number of deploying Soldiers. 
Basically, the program procures sufficient flame-resistant uni-
forms at the beginning of the fiscal year to support that year’s 
deploying Soldiers. However, the number of deploying Soldiers 
has dropped from a peak of around 190,000 Soldiers in FY08, 
at the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF), to current levels of about 15,000 
Soldiers. Therefore, the RFI is procuring fewer flame-resistant 
combat uniforms each year.
As an example, based on a deployment of 15 BCTs, the 
Army would need about 12 months to build the inventory of 
flame-resistant uniforms and field them for all deployed Soldiers. 
This projection is based on the current industrial base, which is 
severely limited by the requirement to buy U.S. products in com-
pliance with the Berry Amendment; on the existing contracts; 
and on the demonstrated capabilities from the introduction of 
the Army Combat Uniform (ACU) with the Universal Cam-
ouflage Pattern in 2005 for OIF and the introduction of the 
Flame Resistant Army Combat Uniform (FRACU) in the OEF 
Camouflage Pattern in 2011. Soldiers would deploy with the 
current issued uniforms, which are not flame resistant, and get 
FUELING NEW APPROACHES
Sgt. Jacob Girardin, a refueler from the10th Combat Aviation Brigade 
(CAB) of the 10th Mountain Division, fuels a Finnish air force F-18/A 
Hornet at Lielvarde Air Base, Latvia, in May. Deploying Soldiers recieve 
the FRACU and the FREE through Rapid Fielding Initiative operations; 
currently, Soldiers wear the ACU in garrison, but one option to boost 
the numbers of combat-ready uniforms available would be to issue a 
single set of combat-ready uniforms that Soldiers wear in garrison and 
overseas. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Thomas Scaggs, 10th CAB)
Achieving readiness will require a 
hard look at acquisition timelines and 
methods. Simply put, it takes a changing 
mindset that prioritizes readiness in 
acquisition decisions.
108 Army AL&T Magazine October-December 2017
THINK READY, BE READY
the flame-resistant versions to meet this surge requirement after 
the industrial base ramps up production and the Army builds up 
its inventory. (See Figure 1.)
This is an unacceptable solution that runs counter to the CSA’s 
readiness priority. After introducing the ACU in 2005, the Army 
recognized the importance of protecting Soldiers from battlefield 
hazards and included specific uniform requirements for protec-
tion against insects (resulting in permethrin treatment) and fire 
or flame (resulting in flame-resistant fabrics). The ACU fab-
ric is a 50-50 mix of cotton and nylon. The FRACU is made 
of 65 percent rayon, 25 percent para-aramid and 10 percent 
nylon. The Flame Resistant Environmental Ensemble (FREE) 
is the flame-resistant version of the seven-layer Generation III 
Extended Cold Weather Clothing System (ECWCS).
When Soldiers deploy to combat today, they are issued both 
the FRACU and the FREE through Rapid Fielding Initiative 
operations. Soldiers do not normally deploy with the clothing 
bag-issued ACU and ECWCS—those are for daily wear in gar-
rison operations and in training.
With close to a decade’s worth of evidence on the benefits of 
flame-resistant combat uniforms, namely reduced combat inju-
ries from burns, it would be unacceptable for Soldiers to deploy 
to future combat operations in non-flame-resistant uniforms. 
R EADY FOR TROUBLE?
To ensure that there are sufficient quantities of flame-resistant combat uniforms for deploying Soldiers, 
the author recommends that the Army maintain sufficient production capacity and supplies to meet surge 
requirements. (Graphic by U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center (USAASC))
With stored sets of FR
uniforms and a warm
industrial base
Without stored sets of 
FR uniforms but with 
a warm industrial base 
supporting RFI 
operations
Without stored sets of 
FR uniforms and 





















Months after decision to support contingency
Without stored sets of ame-resistant (FR) uniforms, elding 15 BCTs with their enablers would take 12 to 15 months.
THE REQUIREMENT FOR FR UNIFORMS IS A RESULT OF OIF AND OEF LESSONS
• It took nine months before RFI supply met elding demands after a uniform change.
• Ten BCTs plus requisite support forces deployed in those nine months with inadequate equipment.
• The use of sets of ame-resistant uniforms fully supports current scenarios and will greatly reduce
   the risk of Soldiers deploying without proper equipment.
FIGURE 1 











That would take the Army to a lower state of readiness and force 
protection. However, that is exactly what could happen this year 
if the Army does nothing to anticipate the surge requirement for 
flame-resistant uniforms for Soldiers deploying in support of a 
major conflict.
ACTION NOW = READINESS LATER
Are there better acquisition approaches for the Army to consider? 
Yes, and now is the time to act—before there is an actual need for 
hundreds of thousands of deploying Soldiers. Current RFI oper-
ations efficiently support deploying Soldiers with flame-resistant 
uniforms. At the same time, current central issue facilities and 
military clothing and sales stores across Army installations sup-
port Soldiers with non-flame-resistant uniforms. This period of 
sustained excellence is the time to plan and prepare the industrial 
base to support a surge requirement for flame-resistant uniforms.
Each of the following three options has advantages and disad-
vantages, but with overall benefits far exceeding the costs of the 
unacceptable status quo. The Army must be able to buy time 
for the industrial base to ramp up production and meet surge 
requirements for flame-resistant uniforms. (See Figure 2.)
Option 1—Leverage the efficiency and excellence of current 
Rapid Fielding Initiative operations. Over the last decade, 
RFI has successfully fielded millions of items to deploying 
Soldiers. The current operation can simultaneously support 
the fielding of flame-resistant uniforms and combat gear for 
up to three brigade combat teams per month. The RFI could 
seamlessly absorb a mission supporting 15 BCTs’ worth of uni-
forms by simply adding that much buffer-stock inventory of 
flame-resistant uniforms to the central warehouse in Lansing, 
Michigan. The storage, distribution, transportation and fielding 
operations for these uniforms would operate similarly to current 
RFI operations.
The barrier to implementation is not affordability but a change-
resistant Army culture. Current RFI operations are 100 percent 
OCO-funded, and this option would require the Army to 
acknowledge the long-term benefit of RFI operations and make 
the RFI an enduring requirement with a commitment to fund 
at least part of the program’s operations from the base bud-
get—essentially institutionalizing that portion of the RFI. As 
a possible model, the Army successfully institutionalized the 
1 2 3Leverage proven RFI elding operations to supply 
deploying Soldiers.
Using Army prepositioned stocks, 
approve an Armywide requirement 
to store sets of FR uniforms as 
contingency stocks.
Consider changing the Soldier’s 
initial issue and subsequent 
clothing bag authorization from  
non-FR uniforms to FR uniforms.
THR EE WAYS TO GO
The author says the Army has three options for buying time for the industrial base to 
ramp up production of flame-resistant uniforms to meet requirements for a possible 
0leaving Soldiers unprepared for combat is unacceptable. (Graphic by USAASC)
FIGURE 2 
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Rapid Equipping Force (REF) by approving it as an enduring 
need and including the REF in its base budget requests.
Option 2—Consider this surge requirement for 
flame- resistant uniforms as a concept similar to Army pre-
positioned stocks (APS), whereby the Army would approve 
the requirement to store sets of flame-resistant uniforms 
as contingency stocks. The APS is a multifunctional set of 
equipment for a BCT or more, stored at a forward location in 
preparation for conflict in that region. Similar to APS opera-
tions, in times of need, the flame-resistant uniforms would be 
taken out of storage and fielded to deploying BCTs. The Army 
already has implemented this concept successfully, albeit on a 
smaller scale, for units of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina, that are supporting the Global Reaction 
Force. The Marine Corps implements a similar storage concept 
for flame-resistant uniforms to support deploying Marines.
The U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, the Army Capa-
bilities Integration Center and the Program Executive Office for 
Soldier proposed a similar concept called deployer equipment 
bundles (DEBs). A validated cost-benefit analysis performed on 
the concept in 2014 concluded that the benefits of having flame-
resistant uniforms stored for future contingencies outweighed 
the costs. Basically, it is less expensive for the Army to store and 
eventually field the uniforms than it is to field flame-resistant 
uniforms and then sustain them for Soldiers.
Again, the barrier to acceptance and implementation is an Army 
culture that’s reluctant to consider change, as well as the lack of 
a system to properly prioritize funding across program evalu-
ation groups (PEGs), which are responsible for DA program 
and budget funding. A DEB-like concept for flame-resistant 
uniforms would call for a base budget requirement, but the 
Army can’t work through its own bureaucracy to determine if 
the equipping, sustaining, training or manning program evalu-
ation groups should cover the bill. Essentially, no single PEG 
will champion the concept because they fear they will be forced 
to pay the entire bill. Additionally, the Army is reluctant to 
fund the procurement and storage of flame-resistant uniforms 
with base budget funding without a requirements document 
approved by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS)—a fundamentally ridiculous situation, given 
that the Army has been buying and fielding flame-resistant uni-
forms to Soldiers for a decade with OCO funding and no need 
for JCIDS approval.
To get a capability production document validated and approved 
just for the sake of securing funding would take years. This cum-
bersome approach is an example of the fundamental disconnects 
between the JCIDS, the acquisition system and the planning, 
programming, budgeting and execution processes—the same 
disconnects that are the root cause of most acquisition program 
failures.
Option 3—Supported by both Congress and industry, this 
option calls for the Army to consider changing the Soldier’s 
initial issue and subsequent clothing bag authorization from 
non-flame-resistant uniforms to flame-resistant uniforms. 
At a minimum, the Army could consider authorizing and issu-
ing a mix of non-flame-resistant and flame-resistant uniforms 
for all Soldiers. This option would allow Soldiers to train in 
flame-resistant uniforms, giving them the same force protection 
benefits during garrison operations and training exercises that 
they get in combat. The uniforms then would be available for 
deployments, immediately and visibly increasing readiness. 
The primary barrier to implementation of this option is afford-
ability. The current cost of a set of ACU blouse and trousers runs 
about $90, while specialized and flame-resistant uniforms are 
significantly more expensive. The ECWCS costs $800, the set of 
FRACUs runs about $175 and the FREE about $2,300. There-
fore, this option would increase the costs for initial issue and the 
clothing replacement allowance for Soldiers. Additionally, these 
bills would be absorbed by the manning and sustaining PEGs 
from already overextended personnel as well as operating and 
support accounts.
The risk of deploying Soldiers to 
combat without flame-resistant 
uniforms is too great to allow concerns 
of affordability and resistance by the 
bureaucracy to outweigh the benefits 
to Soldier readiness. 












The bottom line is that the Army cannot afford to take Soldier 
readiness for granted. Issuing Soldiers flame-resistant uniforms 
or having a stockpile of flame-resistant uniforms available would 
increase readiness and force protection.
Any of the acquisition strategies presented above would allow 
the Army to provide first-deploying Soldiers with flame-resistant 
uniforms and give the industrial base time to ramp up produc-
tion for follow-on deploying Soldiers. There’s enough money in 
the Army’s total obligation authority and budget to support any 
of these options—it’s just a matter of understanding the CSA’s 
intent and getting through the bureaucratic barriers to imple-
ment innovative acquisition approaches.
The risk of deploying Soldiers to combat without flame-resistant 
uniforms is too great to allow concerns of affordability and 
resistance by the bureaucracy to outweigh the benefits to Sol-
dier readiness. Having a useful, innovative readiness plan for the 
flame-resistant uniforms goes beyond this particular case. It is 
also an example of how acquisition leaders can attain a much-
needed readiness mindset that looks around, through and over 
the bureaucratically inclined culture of risk aversion with a 
determination to keep Soldiers properly equipped above all other 
considerations—providing an uncommon but vitally important 
unity of enduring acquisition values, day-to-day practice and 
current Army priorities.
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FEW ER SOLDIERS DEPLOY ED
U.S. Army 82nd Airborne Division Soldiers, deployed in support of Combined Joint Task 
Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, greet Iraqi army troops in June in a Mosul neighborhood 
liberated from the Islamic State group. With the number of deploying U.S. Soldiers down 
to around 15,000 from a peak of about 190,000 in FY08, the Rapid Fielding Initiative is 
procuring fewer flame-resistant combat uniforms each year. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. 
Jason Hull, 82nd Airborne Division Public Affairs)
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